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Abstract 
 
This study experimentally tests the performance in predicting decisions of a reciprocity model that was 
proposed by Dufwenberg et al. (2004). By applying a new approach, the study directly and individually 
predicts a subject's future decision from his past decision. The prediction performance is measured by 
the rate of correct predictions (accuracy) and the gain in the rate of the correct predictions 
(informativeness). Six scenarios of trust game are used to test the model's performance. Further, we 
compare the performance of the model with two other prediction methods; one method uses a decision 
in a dictator game to predict a decision in a trust game; the other uses personal information including 
IQ-test scores, personal attitudes and socio-economic factors. Seventy-nine undergraduate students 
participated in this hand-run experimental study. The results show that the reciprocity model has the 
best performance when compared with other prediction methods. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
"The desire to know the future is universal and constant, …" 
by Dan Gardner in the Future Babble 
 Reciprocity is the issue that has been actively studied in the experimental literature.1 There are 
two types of reciprocity: positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity. The positive reciprocity is a 
situation where a person kindly does something to another person and the second person kindly 
reciprocates. For example, a man gives a woman a gift and she returns him a gift. On the contrary, the 
negative reciprocity is a situation where a person does something bad to another person and the second 
person retaliates against. For example, a man steps on someone's foot and the victim retaliates by 
punching him. 
Most of existing studies on reciprocity tried to point out factors affecting a decision to 
reciprocate or not; for instance, Stanca, Bruni and Corazzini (2009) explored the effect of information set 
to reciprocity; Bhirombhakdi and Potipiti (2012) explored the effect of perceived intention of kindness to 
reciprocity. 
Besides the study of factors affecting reciprocity, some studies proposed new mathematical 
models (reciprocity models) to explain the existing evidences which cannot be explain by standard 
models. These reciprocity models show how an economic agent derives his utility from reciprocating. 
The proposed models can be classified into two types: traditional (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)) and 
psychological (e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)). The 
difference between both types of model is that beliefs (the expectations on other players' decisions) 
endogenously determine a decision in the psychological models while do not in the traditional model.2 
 Recent studies (e.g. Csukás, Fracalanza, Kovács, et al. (2008), Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2008) 
and Stanca, Bruni and Corazzini (2009)) show that psychological models can better explain the reciprocal 
behavior than the traditional models. They also show that beliefs play an important role in determining 
a decision. While, Bolton and Ockenfels (2005) showed that the traditional model proposed by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) is better than the psychological model proposed by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). 
However, none of these studies directly test how well the models can perform predictions. In our 
opinion, prediction performance is one of the most important evidences to determine a model's success 
or failure. We believe that any good model should perform well in two aspects: explain the past and 
predict the future.  
                                                          
1
 For example see Bolle (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Fehr and Gächter (2000), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000 and 
2005), Charness and Rabin (2002), Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2003 and 2008), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), 
McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003), Brülhart and Usunier (2004), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Cox and Deck 
(2005), Csukás, Fracalanza, Kovács and Willinger (2008), Stanca, Bruni and Corazzini (2009), Bhirombhakdi (2011) 
and Bhirombhakdi and Potipiti (2012). 
2
 See Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) for the psychological utility function. 
 To show the explanatory power of models, the studies retrospectively analyzed the existing 
evidences. On the other hand, to show the predictive power, a study should prospectively explore how a 
model can fit to new evidences. 
 This study designs a new experiment to test a performance of a reciprocity model in predicting 
positive reciprocity decisions. To illustrate that a model is good for the predictive purpose, we concern 
two characteristics: the rate of correct predictions (accuracy) and the marginal gain of the rate of 
correct predictions (informativeness). 
 Because recent studies support the psychological models, we select a reciprocity model that is 
the psychological type to be studied. For the sake of simplicity, we choose a simplest but well-known 
psychological model which is Dufwenberg et al. (2004) (henceforth we call it "DK model").  
 In addition to testing the prediction power of the DK model, we also compare the DK model’s 
prediction power with other prediction methods that are less complicated. Two less-complicated-logistic 
models are constructed and measured for their performance; one model is determined by a decision in 
a dictator game and the other is determined by personal information including IQ-test scores, personal 
attitudes and socio-economic factors. 
 The article is organized as follows. We present our measurement approach and the trust game 
and the DK model in the section 2-4, respectively. The scenarios to test the model are presented in 
section 5. Section 6 presents experiment protocol. Sections 7 and 8  show the results and conclusion. 
 
2. Our performance measurement approach 
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[Fig. 1 Left or Right?] 
 We present a simple model to illustrate how we design an experiment to measure a model's 
performance (accuracy and informativeness) in predicting decisions. 
 As presented in Fig. 1, for simplicity we use a one-player game in which the first player makes a 
left   or right   decision.  After making decision, he and the second player get material payoffs specified 
at the terminal nodes. We assume that       and      .  
 In this study, to test the performance of a model we individually infer a subject's decision in a 
future scenario (which is called "tested scenario") from his past decision in another scenario (which is 
called "conditional scenario"). For example, suppose we would like to test the performance of the 
altruistic utility function model:  (    )    (  )     (  ) where   for   *   + is the player  
  's 
material payoffs,    *   + is the first player's decision and     is the first player's type that is a 
relative weight between his material payoffs   and the second player's  . And, as presented in Fig. 1, 
let the tested scenario have the following point structure (       )  (               ). 
 According to the altruistic utility function model, the first player's best response function is 
   {  |          
   
   
                  }. According to the point structure, if    , the 
player chooses left and vice versa. 
 Since the player's type is private information, before we can predict his future decision we need 
to learn his type from his past decision in the conditional scenario. We design the conditional scenario of 
which the best response function is the same as in the tested scenario. For instance, we apply the 
scenario with point structure (       )  (             ) as the conditional scenario since a subject 
will choose left in this scenario if his     which is the same best response function as of the tested 
scenario.  
Assuming that the player’s type is invariant across scenarios, the decision of the player in tested 
and conditional scenario must be identical. Therefore, we can infer his decision in the tested scenario 
from that in the conditional scenario. 
 As we have seen from the example above, testing the predictive power of a utility function 
needs three steps. First, under the model's specification, design a conditional scenario that is closely 
related to tested scenarios. Second, learn each subject's type from his decision in the conditional 
scenario. Last, predict the decision in the tested scenario according to the subject's type implied by his 
decision in the conditional scenario. 
 To our knowledge, this study is the first study that applies this approach to test the performance 
of a reciprocity model in predicting decisions. Here, it is worth discussing the strength and weakness of 
this approach. The strength is: i) the approach can be extended to apply for any model that has more 
than one parameter. For instance, if a model has two parameters, the approach uses two conditional 
scenarios to learn each subject's type. Moreover, since the approach provides exact predictions 
individually, ii) we can directly count for the model’s accuracy. 
 However, the approach has its weakness. i) A model that is tested for its performance must be 
well specified; precisely, like the altruistic model and the DK model that will be tested in this study, 
every function in the model must be explicitly specified. ii) Since we infer each subject’s future decision 
from his type learnt from previous decision, the assumption of type-invariance across scenarios is 
required. Also, iii) for each subject, many treatments (conditional + tested scenarios) are necessary. It is 
unavoidable that long experiments may generate unsatisfied data quality.3 
 
3. Trust game 
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[Fig. 2 Trust game] 
 In this study, we apply the trust game to test the DK model using six designed scenarios (one 
conditional scenario and five the tested scenarios).  As presented in Fig. 2, we use the trust game to 
model a positive reciprocity situation. The game is sequentially played and has two players: first and 
second. The first player decides whether to stop   or trustfully continue   the game. If the game was 
continued, the second player gets     additional points and makes his decision whether to selfishly 
take   all the additional points or reciprocally return   the first player   points (     ). 
 
4. The DK model and its best response function 
  (      )    ( )      (   )                                                          ( ) 
 The DK model is presented in (1).4 It shows that player    's psychological utility function. 
Player’s utility is derived from two parts: his material payoff   and psychological payoff that in this case 
is called reciprocal payoff   . The reciprocal parameter       or type is a relative weight between the 
two parts. According to the trust game as presented in Fig. 2, the less the value of the type of player 2 
the more likely he will choose taking  . The material payoff is determined by the strategy profile  . In 
our trust game,   (     ) where    *   + and    *   + are decisions of the first and second 
players respectively. In addition to the strategy profile, beliefs or expectations on opponents' decisions 
  play an important role in determining reciprocal payoff and decision. For instance, the first player who 
expects that the second player to reciprocally return   is more likely to continue than the one who 
expects the opposite. 
                                                          
3
 See "chronic nuisances" in Friedman and Sunder (1947), pp. 29-30. 
4
 See Appendix for the full version of the DK model. 
 In this study, we focus on the second player's decision: to reciprocate by choosing returning   or 
not reciprocate by choosing taking  . According to the DK model and the game, we can theoretically 
derive the second player's best response function    , 
    {  |
              
            
}                                                      ( ) 
where   
 
 
 and   
 
   
.5 The second player will reciprocally return the first player if he his reciprocal 
parameter is sufficiently,     . He will choose taking if       . 
 
5. Scenarios 
 As presented above, in order to infer a decision in a tested scenario from a decision in a 
conditional scenario, we design the scenarios such that the second player has the same best response in 
all scenarios. As presented in (2), the critical level of the reciprocal parameter in the best response 
function depends on   and  . Therefore, to fix the level of   and   we fix       and       in all 
scenarios. 
 Now, according to the Fig. 2, each scenario is designed differently by specifying the point 
structure (     ). As presented in Table 1, we design six scenarios. The 1st scenario is the conditional 
scenario where we learn each subject's type. The other five scenarios are the tested scenarios where we 
predict each subject's decision according to his learnt type. 
 The tested scenarios are designed to test the DK model's performance and robustness in various 
situations. We hypothesize: i) the level of stake (1st-3rd scenarios) does not affect the behavior but very 
low level of stake (4th scenario) will affect it. ii) Even though the scenarios present positive reciprocity, 
behavior in the decision-to-gain scenario is different from the decision-to-loss one (6th scenario). Loss 
aversion may play an important role in positive reciprocity situation. iii) As concluded in Bhirombhakdi 
and Potipit (2012), the cost of continuing (5th scenario) that is defined by the difference between the 
possible lowest points of each decision of the first player, precisely    , may affect the second player's 
behavior. As we will see in the next section, our experimental results support these hypotheses. 
 [Table 1 Scenarios and their exogenous factors] 
Conditional/tested 
scenario 
Number       
Important factors 
(compared to the conditional scenario) 
Conditional 1 100 100 100 - 
Tested 
2 50 50 50 Lower level of stake 
3 200 200 200 Higher level of stake 
4 0 0 0 Zero level of stake 
5 50 50 150 Lower cost of continuing 
                                                          
5
 See Appendix for the derivation of (2). 
6 -200 -600 -200 Negative point structure 
 
6. Experiment protocol 
 This hand-run economic experiment was conducted during 24th August - 6th September 2011 at 
Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. There were four sessions. To implement a 
double-blinded experiment, each session were conducted by trained staff. 
 Announcement about the experiment were posted around the Faculty of Economics of the 
university and were distributed in a social network. The announcements informed the length of each 
session (90 minutes), the minimum-maximum payment (100-400 baht), and the tasks each subject 
would do. 
 Seventy nine undergraduate students voluntarily participated. Each participant made 
anonymous contingent decision plans prior to knowing his exact role and his opponent. Each participant 
would be randomly assigned a role and matched with another participant at the end of the experiment. 
Each subject did five different tasks: answered an IQ test, made a decision in a dictator game, answered 
a set of questions that tested for their understanding of the trust game, made decisions in eight trust 
games (which six games are presented in this article) and completed a set of questionnaires that 
composed of personal attitudes and socio-economic factors. 
 Subjects were informed that they would be paid for each task according to different criteria. The 
IQ-test task would be paid according to each subject's scores. The dictator-game task would be paid 
according to his decision. The understanding-test task would be paid according to correctness. The trust-
game task would be paid according to his decision plan and randomly matched opponent's decision 
plan. The questionnaire task would be paid fifty Thai baht. 
 To prevent learning effect and dependent decisions, the eight trust games were separated into 
four sets (2 games/set) and were inserted in an envelope.6 Subjects were required to make their 
decisions by following this rule: draw one set at a time, complete all decisions in the drawn set, carefully 
check the decisions since changing any decision after this step is not allowed, return the completed set 
to the envelope, draw the next set and follow the process until the last set is completed. Moreover, staff 
also monitored and warned any subject who did not follow the rule. 
                                                          
6
 The trust games were played in the same sequence for all subjects; there is no re-shuffle. We put the 6
th
 scenario 
(which has negative point structure) at last and randomly ordered the rest five scenarios; then we put two other 
trust games (which represent negative-reciprocity situations) at the 3
rd
 and 6
th
 places, hence the six scenarios in 
our interests were separated into three groups (precisely, 1
st
 and 2
nd
 then breaking by 3
rd
 which is the extra game, 
4
th
 and 5
th
 then breaking by 6
th
 and, last, 7
th
 and 8
th
). Then, as mentioned, we separated the games into four sets 
and inserted them in an envelope. 
 To prevent subjects of being framed their perception toward game or reciprocity situation, this 
study implemented the framing-effect-free environment by using neutral words: "situation" instead of 
"game", "decision A" instead of "stop", "person" instead of "player", etc.7 
 
7. Performance of the DK model 
 We present the results in three sections. First, we discuss the baseline which is the rate of 
correct predictions using the majority decision. We then discuss the performance of the DK model. Last, 
we compare the performance of the DK model and that of the other methods. 
 [Table 2 Baseline, accuracy and informativeness from applying the DK model] 
 Tested scenario 
Measurements 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Baseline 71% 71% 57% 80% 94% 
Accuracy  85% 82% 81% 81% 75% 
Informativeness 14% 11% 24% 1% -19% 
 
7.1 Baseline 
As presented in Table 2, the baselines, which is the majority decision -- choose taking   -- are in 
the range of 57% - 94% (the 1st scenario's baseline is 73%). It presents the rate of the simplest prediction 
method. The pretty wide range implies that subjects did not significantly randomize their decisions. If 
they significantly randomize their decisions the range would be narrow. 
 Some observations from the baselines are worth discussing. First, the 6th scenario is the only 
scenario that has negative point structure (       ).  The scenario has the highest baseline (94% of 
subject chose taking  ) and the lowest reciprocity rate, 6%. This result implies that in addition to 
positive reciprocity there were other factors strongly affecting the second players' decisions in this 
scenario. Since the scenario has negative point structure that makes each subject make a decision to 
loss, loss aversion may explain such the behavior. 
 The baseline of the 4th scenario is the lowest at 57%. In other words the reciprocity rate of the 
scenario is the highest. Even though the 4th scenario is different from the 1st-3rd scenarios only at the 
level of stake but its baseline is significantly lower than others'. We believe that the important factor 
that makes subjects prefer choosing returning   to taking   in the 4th scenario more than that in the 1st-
3rd scenarios is the guilt or sympathy. Guilt and sympathy were respectively discussed in Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg (2007) and Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989). Both guilt and sympathy are 
psychological factors that alter one's utility and can increase the reciprocity rate. The second player feels 
                                                          
7
 See Zizzo (2010) for the framing effect of "setting the scene" as one cause of the experiment demand effects that 
confounds an experiment. 
guiltier when choosing    and leaving the first player nothing in the 4th scenario than in the 1st-3rd 
scenarios.  In the 1st-3rd scenarios , choosing    does leave player 1 some positive points. Therefore, the 
second player is less likely to choose taking   in the 4th scenario. Similar explanation can apply to the 
case of sympathy. 
 Among the positive-point-structure scenarios (1st-5th scenario), the 5th scenario has the highest 
baseline (80%). Bhirombhakdi and Potipiti (2012) discussed that the cost of continuing of the first player 
signals the second player his intention of kindness giving. The higher the level of intention, the more the 
reciprocity rate (equivalently, the less the baseline) is. Precisely, the 5th scenario has lower the cost of 
continuing (-150 points) than the others (0 point). Consequently, the baseline of the 5th scenario is 
higher than the others'. 
 The 1st-3rd scenarios that have similar point structures show approximately equal level of the 
baselines: 73%, 71% and 71% in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd scenarios respectively. The only difference between 
the scenarios is the level of stake. Precisely, the 2nd scenario has the lowest level of stake by assigning 
the point structure (        ), the 1st scenario has medium the level (         ) and 
the 3rd scenario has the highest the level (         ). The results show that in the aggregated 
level, the level of stake does not significantly affect the second players' decisions. A practical implication 
of this result is that at the aggregate level, we can accurately infer the second players' decisions in one 
trust game from another trust game. 
 
7.2 Accuracy and informativeness 
According to the DK model and our experimental design, if a subject chose taking   in the 
conditional scenario, he will also choose taking   in the 2nd scenario, and vice versa. Table 2 shows the 
accuracy test of this implication. The accuracy (the rate of correct predictions) is 81% - 85% (82.25% on 
average) in the 2nd-5th scenario and 75% in the 6th scenario. If a subject chose taking   in the conditional 
scenario, we correctly predict at 85% that he will also choose taking   in the 2nd scenario, and vice versa. 
We now turn to informativeness (which is the marginal gains in accuracy when compared with the 
baseline). Table 2 shows that applying the DK model to predict decisions in the 2nd-5th scenarios is 
informative but not informative in the 6th scenario.   
Further since the informativeness as reported in the Table 2 is the mean value measurement 
which, in statistics, is possible to be indifferent to zero or uninformative, then we perform the 
"significance test of informativeness" by applying the following logistic regression model 
  (
   
     
)                                                                            ( ) 
where     = 1 if the subject  
   chooses taking   in the     scenario and = 0 otherwise;   *          + 
is the index of each subject and   *         + is the index of each tested scenario;     = 1 if the subject 
    chooses taking   in the conditional scenario and = 0 otherwise.     and     are constant and 
coefficient of the corresponding scenario    .     is the disturbance of the subject  
   in the 
corresponding scenario    . The term        in (3) represents how the decision in the conditional 
scenario     provides information to explain the decision in tested scenario    ; it represents the 
informativeness. For instance,       means the decision in the conditional scenario does not help 
explaining the decision in tested scenario. 
[Table 3 The significance test of informativeness] 
Tested scenario: 
  in (3) 
 ̂   
(p-value) 
 ̂   
(p-value) 
F statistics 
(        ) 
Informativeness/Uninformativeness 
(tested at 0.05 level of significance) 
    
-1.16 
(0.02) 
3.15 
(0.00) 
48.98 Significantly informative 
    
-0.92 
(0.06) 
2.75 
(0.00) 
35.27 Significantly informative 
    
-3.00 
(0.00) 
4.14 
(0.00) 
51.86 Significantly informative 
    
-0.10 
(0.83) 
2.46 
(0.00) 
23.18 Significantly informative 
    
1.79 
(0.00) 
1.54 
(0.11) 
3.10 Significantly uninformative 
 
 To test whether applying the DK model is significantly informative, we treat (3) as the 
unrestricted model and do the F-test by comparing with the restricted model of (3) that treats      . 
As presented in Table 3, at 0.05 level of significance the regression result (that are corrected by with 
Huber/White Robust covariances) of each tested scenario rejects the null hypothesis that the term 
       is uninformative in the 2
nd-5th scenarios but does not reject in the 6th scenario. Hence, applying 
the DK model to predict decisions in the positive-point-structure scenarios (2nd-5th scenarios) is 
significantly informative. In conclusion, when applying it to predict decisions in the positive-point-
structure scenarios, the DK model has good performance in both accuracy and informativeness aspects. 
 In the 6th scenario, applying the DK model for prediction shows poor performance. Comparing to 
the accuracy of other scenarios that have positive point structures, the accuracy in the 6th scenario is 
significantly lower. The result implies that inferring a subject's decision in a negative-point-structure 
scenario (the 6th scenario) from his type learnt from his decision in a positive-point-structure scenario 
(the conditional scenario) is inappropriate. 
 Since the informativeness measures the difference between the accuracy and the baseline, 
together with the low accuracy, the highest baseline of the 6th scenario makes applying the DK model be 
uninformative. However, the baseline at 94% is very high. So, it might be difficult or even impossible to 
apply any prediction method to improve upon the baseline. 
 
7.3 Comparing the performance of the DK model and other prediction methods 
 The previous results show that applying the DK model in predicting decisions is accurate and 
informative. However, to tell that the DK model well performs we still need to compare the DK model's 
performance to other alternative models'. We consider the alternative models which are less 
complicated in applying them to perform the predictions than the DK model. We construct two 
alternative models. In the first model, instead of learning the subject's type from his decision in the 
trust-game conditional scenario, we learn his type from other situation; precisely, it is the dictator game. 
In the second model, instead of learning the type from decision data (notice that we learnt individual 
type in the DK model and the first alternative model from his decision in the conditional scenario and 
dictator game), we apply non-decision data like socio-economic factors to do so. 
 Precisely, for the first alternative model we use a dictator game (henceforth, we call this method 
"DG method"); it is a game that only the first player who is called the dictator makes a decision of 
splitting the total amount of game points for himself and his recipient. In this study, the total amount 
are 200 points and the dictator can split in integer since 0 - 200 points for himself. It is a one-shot game 
that is less complicated than the trust game which is a two-shot game. Moreover, the dictator game is 
the simplest game that represents the interaction between economic agents who concerned social 
norms, fairness, altruism, etc. [Guala and Mittone (2010)]. Also, the DK model shows that the amount of 
points the dictator keeps for himself has negative relationship with the reciprocal parameter    in the 
model.8 Hence, the more the amount that a subject keeps for himself in the dictator game the less likely 
he will choose return   in the trust game. In other words, the decision in the dictator game can be used 
to predict the decision in the trust game. 
 For the second alternative model, we use personal information including IQ-test scores, 
personal attitudes and individual socio-economic factors to represent each subject's type (henceforth, 
we call this method "personal-info method"). As non-decision-making data, gathering the personal 
information is less complicated than gathering the decision-making data like the DG method; hence we 
consider the personal-info method as the least complicated among the three prediction methods in this 
study. 
 We measure accuracy of each method by: randomly group the subjects into two groups (the 
first group with       and the second group with      ), use the data of the first group (in-sample) 
to regress in a logistic model (equation (4) and (5) present the models of DG and personal-info methods 
respectively), use the estimated coefficients to find the fitted value of each subject's decision in the 
second (out-of-sample) group and compare the fitted value to the actual decision to measure the 
accuracy. Since the fitted value  ̂ is in the range ,   - but the actual decision is a pure strategy (either 0 
or 1), we assign  ̂    if the value is in ,     - and   otherwise. 
  (
   
     
)                                                                                      ( ) 
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 See Appendix for the proof of the relationship between the decision in the dictator game and reciprocal 
parameter. 
  (
   
     
)      ∑        
 
   
                                                                       ( )9 
where     = 1 if the subject  
   chooses taking   in the     scenario and = 0 otherwise;   *          + 
is the index of each subject in the first group;10   *       + is the index of each tested scenario.     is 
the game points that the subject     kept for himself in the dictator game.      where   *         + 
is the subject    's selected personal information in the     scenario;   is the total numbers of the 
selected personal information.11         are constants and coefficients of the corresponding variables in 
the     scenario where   *   +.         are disturbances of each subject in the corresponding the 
model in the     scenario. 
[Table 4 Accuracy from applying the DK model, DG method and personal-info method] 
 
Accuracy 
Tested scenario DK model DG method Personal-info method 
2nd 85% 78% 53% 
3rd 82% 78% 73% 
4th 81% 80% 70% 
5th 81% 80% 60% 
 
 Table 4 presents the accuracy from applying each method: the DK model, DG method and 
personal-info method. The results show that applying the DK model yields the highest accuracy, hence 
the method has the best performance. The results also imply for the validity of the DK model; the model 
prospectively (and retrospectively) fits to evidences and can perform predictions better than other 
prediction methods. 
 Moreover, the results show some noteworthy observations. The DK model and the DG method 
yield higher accuracy rates than that from the personal-info method significantly. This result shows that 
predicting a decision by using decision-making data to learn the decision maker's type is better than 
using non-decision-making data. 
                                                          
9
 For example, the regression result of (5) in the case that     (predicting decisions in the 2nd scenario) is 
  .
   
     
/                                                 where        = 1 if the subject  
   has 
type 6
th
 of the Enneagram of Personality and = 0 otherwise, and vice versa for        and       ;       is the age 
of the subject    . Since this study does not aim to explore determinants that affect decisions, the regression 
results of (4) and (5) are not provided in this article. They will be provided upon request. 
10
 The number of observations in the first group is assigned to each subject randomly by: assign a random number 
which is drawn from a uniform distribution to each subject, order the subjects according to the assigned random 
number and assign the number of observation according to the order. 
11
 We selected the factors    by: find Spearman's rank correlation coefficient between the decision in the 1
st
 
scenario and the personal  information, select the factors that show their correlations are statistically significant at 
level of 0.2, regress the selected factors in the model, drop out one factor that shows its coefficient is the most 
statistically insignificant and re-regressed the dropped-out model, repeat the dropping-out process until all factors 
in the model shows their coefficients are statistically significant at level of 0.05. 
 The results also support the potency of the dictator game to capture a subject's type on social 
preferences related to positive reciprocity. The accuracy of applying the DG method is quite high (  
significantly at the level of 0.05). The regression results of (4) show a negative relationship between the 
amount of points taken by a dictator and the likelihood of choosing returning  . The more points the 
dictator takes for himself, the less likely he chooses returning   in a trust game. 
  
8. Conclusions and remarks 
 This study tests the DK model’s performance in predicting positive-reciprocity decisions. A new 
approach to measure the model's performance is introduced. In this approach, we design a conditional 
scenario to learn each subject's type and infer his future decisions in the tested scenarios from his type. 
The rate of correct predictions (accuracy) and the marginal gain in the rate (informativeness) are 
measured as the indication for the model’s performance. Six scenarios of trust game (one conditional 
scenario and five tested scenarios) are employed in hand-run economic experiment. The results show 
that the DK model has good performance -- above 80% in accuracy and informative. 
 Furthermore, we compare the DK model's performance with two other prediction methods. The 
first method estimates a logistic model using the decisions in the tested scenarios as dependent 
variables and decision in a dictator game as the explanatory variable. Then the estimated model is 
applied for predicting decision. The second is similar to the first method except that in the logistic 
model, personal information is used instead of information from decision in a dictator game. The results 
also show that applying the DK model is better than the other two methods. 
 For further studies, there are many possibilities to explore. One may explore the limitations of 
the DK model in other scenarios. One may explore other models' performance by applying our 
approach. Or, one may explore on the issues that are additionally observed in this study such as, like 
what we observed that the baseline of the 4th scenario is different from of the 1st-3rd scenarios, one may 
explore this boundary. 
 
Appendix 
A.1 The DK model and derivation of (2) 
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 )         ( ) 
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 The system of equations (6)-(9) presents the DK model that is applied to the second player in the 
trust game. According to (1), the reciprocal payoff    is derived from the interaction between kindness 
giving    (how the second player gives kindness to the first player) and kindness perceiving    (how the 
second player perceives kindness from the first player). Besides the second player's decisions   , both 
kindness-giving and -perceiving functions are determined by the second player's beliefs or expectations -
-     *   + is the second player's expectation on the first player's decision and      *   + is the 
second player's expectation on the first player's expectation on the second player's decision -- and each 
player's equitable payoff (  
  for the first player's and   
  for the second player's). 
 The kindness-giving function    is measured by the difference between the second player's 
expectation on the first player's material payoff  ,  - and his equitable payoff   
  that is derived by the 
arithmetic mean between the maximum and minimum of the first player's expected material payoff 
(    ,  - and     ,  - respectively). Precisely,     ,  -         (      ) and     ,  -  
       (      ). Let       if the second player believes that the first player chooses stopping   and 
      for choosing continuing; and      if the second player chooses taking   and      for 
choosing returning. Hence, under the trust game as presented in Fig. 2 we get 
        (     ),    (    )(   )-  
 
 
,      (     )(    )- 
where the first and second terms are  ,  - and the last term is   
 . 
 Similarly, the kindness-perceiving function    is measured by the difference between the second 
player's expectation on his material payoff  ,  - and his equitable payoff   
  where     ,  -  
        (        ) and     ,  -          (        ) are respectively the maximum and 
minimum of his material payoff. Let        if the second player believes that the first player believe 
the second player will choose taking and        for choosing returning. Hence, we get 
        (     ),    (   )  (      )(     )-  
 
 
(  (      ) ) 
where the first and second terms are  ,  - and the last term is   
 . 
 According to the trust game in Fig. 2, let      if the first player chooses stopping   and      
for choosing continuing; given the first player's continuing  , the second player's utility function is 
derived as, 
       (    )    ((     ) (
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    ) (  (      ) ))       (  ) 
Then we apply the sequential reciprocity equilibrium as proposed by Dufwenberg et al. (2004) to 
characterize the second player's best response function     as presented in (2). At equilibrium, i) 
decisions and beliefs are consistent and ii) the utility of in-equilibrium decision is weakly better than of 
other decision. Precisely, the second player's decision and beliefs (  
     
      
 ) constitutes the 
equilibrium if    
    ,   
      
  and   (     
 |   
      
 )    (     |   
      
 ). 
 Let      if the second player chooses taking   and      for choosing returning. Since the 
second player's decision node is active by the first player's continuing, we know that in equilibrium of 
the second player       
   . Then, choose taking   is the second player's best response if 
  (   |   )    (   |   ) 
   
 
 
 
and vice versa for choosing returning   be the best response. Hence, we derive (2). 
A.2 The relationship between the decision in a dictator game and reciprocal parameter 
 This section proofs the negative relationship between the amount of points the dictator keeps 
for himself and his reciprocal parameter in the DK model. 
Proof: 
 In this study, in the dictator game a subject makes a decision    ,     - and      to keep    
amount for himself. Theoretically, the subject chooses    that gives him the highest utility. Precisely, 
according to the DK model (as presented in (6) - (9)), the subject chooses    that solves the following 
optimization problem (P1), 
   
  
         (        )  (    )                                              (  ) 
where   is the equitable payoff that we assume the payoff be equal for both players (e.g. the equitable 
payoff is 100 points which is the half of the total amount). 
 Let   
  solve (P1), since   is constant, then we get the first-order condition as, 
   
   
|
     
 
     (       
 )                                                            (  ) 
Then, re-arranging (11) can show the negative relationship between the amount of points the subject 
keeps for himself   
  and the reciprocal parameter   .
12 
Q.E.D. 
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 Also, the problem (P1) satisfies the second-order condition at   
 , 
    
   
 |
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